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ONE CIVIL LIBERTARIAN AMONG MANY:
THE CASE OF MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG
Ira H. Carmen*
is common knowledge that in recent times the constitutional
issues of greatest magnitude and of greatest public interest lie
in the area of civil liberties. These cases almost always call for the
delicate balancing of the rights of the individual, allegedly protected by a specific clause in the Constitution, and the duties that
state or federal authority can exact from citizens in order that
society may maintain a minimum standard of peace and security.
It follows, therefore, that it is these often dramatic decisions which
will largely color the images we have of participating Justices. Assume a free speech controversy. Stanley Reed's image? He typically
voted against a first amendment claim. Sherman Minton? The probabilities are similar. Earl Warren? The opposite. William 0. Douglas? He generally supports such claims. Law School classes as well
as graduate seminars in political science are forever talking about
the "Black faction" and the "Frankfurter bloc." Comparing and
contrasting the two has become a fairly common exercise.
Arthur J. Goldberg came to the Supreme Court in time to participate in all of the decisions handed down during the 1962 Term.
He resigned his office soon after the conclusion of the 1964 Term.
What image does his name evoke after less than three years on the
bench? If a member of the American Civil Liberties Union were
asked what he thought of President Kennedy's appointments to the
Court, his response would probably be: "Goldberg is a good man,
but White has been a disappointment." In short, if Goldberg's
image is at all accurate, the probabilities favor his support of a
"libertarian" as opposed to a "societal" interpretation of appropriate provisions of the Constitution. On the other hand, if our hypothetical A.C.L.U. advocate, or anyone else for that matter, were
asked to generalize about Goldberg's point of view vis-a-vis other
Justices with a similar orientation, that is, if he were asked whether
there are any significant differences among the so-called "libertarian" ideologies presently represented on the Court, the chances are
good that his response would be vague and indecisive.
This paper has two basic purposes:

I

T

I. To demonstrate empirically that Mr. Justice Goldberg, was,
in fact, inclined to espouse the constitutional philosophy
• Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Coe College.-Ed.
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relating to personal rights which his image projects. An extension of the use of appropriate techniques will also permit
a classification of his eight colleagues along a "liberty-authority" continuum for the same period of time.
2. To analyze the similarities and, more important, the dissimilarities between Goldberg and other Justices of a similar
ideological bent so as to understand better the complexities
of his civil libertarian commitment.
If, indeed, there is a "Black bloc" with an individualistic credo,
the scholar must do more than isolate this credo from competing
constitutional philosophies. He must also acquaint himself with
its internal dynamics. Insofar as Arthur Goldberg is concerned, he
must present his subject not just as a member of an alliance, but
as an individual as well.

I.

MODE OF ANALYSIS AND EMERGING BLOCS

The process which has been selected to determine those Justices
who, during the 1962-1964 Terms, seemed to espouse the constitutional doctrine of "libertarianism" is somewhat different from other
quantitative approaches that have been used to discern judicial
voting propensities.1 First, each formal opinion or per curiam holding which contained a clear divergence of opinion on a civil liberties issue was included in the sample. The phrase "civil liberties
issue" comprises all claims of privilege brought to the Supreme
Court which were predicated on the first eight amendments, the
fourteenth 2 and fifteenth amendments, and other specific clauses in
the Constitution which can reasonably be thought to preserve
fundamental liberties of the person, such as the prohibition against
bills of attainder and the guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus.
Second, in coding the responses of Justices to conflicting interpretations of these provisions, two mutually exclusive indices were
developed. The first assigned "libertarian" votes to Supreme Court
members who specifically opposed a "societal" interpretation held
to be valid by at least one of their number. In other words, should
the Justices split in resolving a fourth amendment issue, those who
1. See Appendix A for a critical analysis of the techniques that have been utilized
by political scientists C. Herman Pritchett, Glendon Schubert and others.
2. However, claims which sought to invoke the fourteenth amendment's protection of property interests were not scored except for those instances in which the
"just compensation" provision was being applied to state action. It is clear that the
civil libertarians on the Court are precisely those Justices who most vigorously oppose the "invisible radiations" of substantive due process or equal protection as to
this class of cases. See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. Neill, 380 U.S. 451 (1965).
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supported the community's interest in the fruits of a search or
seizure would be coded as being opposed to those who found in
favor of the individual's interest in being free from government interference; the former would therefore be viewed as having expressed
"pro-societal" sentiments while the latter would be considered as
having advocated a "pro-libertarian" posture. The second index
consisted of Mr. Justice Goldberg's "pairs" with each of his colleagues in these cases irrespective of the attitude espoused.
It should be obvious that these indices could not have been
constructed without a careful content analysis of the cases involved.
Some of the guidelines used in performing this task deserve mention. First, no formal or per curiam opinion was included unless
a unique constitutional question was in dispute. For example, consider a per curiam decision in which the Court reversed the lower
court's decision in a one-sentence opinion, citing as authority only
an earlier case, while the dissenters merely made note of their opposition as explicated in that prior case.3 Or, consider the several
reapportionment cases decided (by formal opinion) on the basis
of Reynolds v. Sims.4 Several of these have been excluded from the
count of holdings because once one knows that the Court advocates
the "one man-one vote" rule there is nothing in the facts of these
later controversies which makes them unique. 5 Second, Justices are
coded together even if they did not join one another's opinions
if content analysis reveals that they stand as one on the constitutional issue in question. This criterion might be applicable to those
dissenting separately, to those concurring separately, and to both
concurring and dissenting Justices vis-a-vis the ~pinion of the Court.
It follows, therefore, that content analysis may also reveal that concurrences are in the nature of dissents, in that they represent disagreements along the "libertarian" dimension.
The principle difference, however, between the mode of classification utilized in this study and others that have been attempted
is that this technique places greater emphasis on the constitutional
nuances of the cases in the sample and permits the counting of
several issues of importance in a single case. Consider A Quantity
of Books v. Kansas. 6 The attorney general of Kansas had directed
a county sheriff to seize and impound, pending a hearing, copies of
3. See, e.g., Fields v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 522 (1963).
4. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
5. See, e.g., WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, Inc., 377 U.S. 633 (1964). However, Lucas
v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964), was included because of the referendum
facet of that case. Mr. Justice Harlan is coded in opposition to the Court's holding even
though he felt his dissent in Reynolds was sufficient to cover the issues presented.
6. 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
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certain paperback novels which he deemed obscene. In an ex parte
proceeding conducted prior to confiscation, a district judge perused
several of the titles, concluded that the books appeared to be obscene, and issued an order to effect the seizure. By a vote of seven
to two, the Supreme Court reversed the state supreme court's decision upholding the attorney general's actions. Four of the Justices
(Brennan, Warren, Goldberg, and White) thought that the procedure was a violation of first amendment rights because it did not
adequately safeguard against the suppression of books which were
not obscene. Justices Black and Douglas, on the other hand, believed that the state could not pass any law inhibiting the dissemination of allegedly obscene books. They did not "find it necessary
to consider the procedural questions" which had buttressed Mr.
Justice Brennan's opinion. 7 Mr. Justice Stewart supplied the seventh
vote by noting that he had read the books, that he considered them
protected by the first amendment, and that, therefore, they could
not be proscribed whatever the means. He added, however, that
the law would be constitutional if it were applied to hard-core pornography. In dissent, Justices Clark and Harlan argued that the
state could reasonably ban the books in question and that the means
used in this particular case did not violate first amendment privileges.
This is an instance in which controversy was so bitter that no
opinion was ·written for the Court. It is submitted that the only
feasible way to unravel the conflicting constitutional philosophies
at issue in this case is to apply content analysis to the opinions of
the Justices. In this way the subtle shadings of "libertarianism" become more manifest, and the divisions among Supreme Court members are more clearly exposed. The first cleavage appears to center
around the validity of the procedures invoked by Kansas officials
to deal with obscene literature. Four Justices denounced these
practices as violations of first amendment liberties; three Justices,
Harlan, Clark, and Stewart, opposed this conclusion; 8 Justices Black
and Douglas did not even discuss the procedural aspect of the case
and therefore should not be coded as participants in its resolution.
A second significant issue in this case deals with whether the books
themselves were obscene. While this is also a first amendment question, it is of a much different nature than the procedural inquiry.
This is illustrated by Stewart's concurrence, for he found that the
7. Id. at 213.
8. Stewart was noncommittal on the constitutionality of the statute vis-a-vis the
books which the judge had not inspected in advance of seizure. This is irrelevant for
present purposes, however.
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procedures were valid, but agreed with Black and Douglas that
the books were not obscene; only Harlan and Clark thought that
these volumes could be suppressed; since the other four Justices
deliberately avoided the question of obscenity, their votes cannot
be counted on this issue.9
The initial step to pinpoint "libertarian" sentiment on the
Court was to locate those cases in a particular term which contained
divergent interpretations of relevant constitutional issues. Participations and "libertarian" responses were counted, and percentages
were computed by dividing the former into the latter. Looking first
at the 1962 Term, it can be seen that twenty decisions including
twenty-four issues qualified for tabulation. 10
TABLE A
LIBERTARIAN REsPONSES,

Douglas
Warren
Black
Goldberg
Brennan
White
Stewart
Clark
Harlan

1962 TERM

Participations

Libertarian Responses

Percentage

24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24

24
22
21
21
21
12
8
8
3

100
92
88
88
88
50
33
33
13

These figures confirm the fact that there were five members of
the Court who consistently construed the relevant provisions of the
Constitution so as to favor the personal rights of the individual.10a
However, the identification of ideological clusters in Supreme Court
decision-making requires more than the casuistic "these Justices
seem to vote alike most of the time." A more rigorous test which
could well be applied in our study is Schubert's Index of Interagreement, which is computed by taking each pair of Justices in
the sample and dividing their joint participations into their joint
9. Under the criteria established for application of this "issues test," a third
cleavage would ordinarily have to be coded. This would have the effect of setting
off Black and Douglas from those Justices who believed that obscenity could be
proscribed as a matter of law. This issue, however, is dealt with in another controversy, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). See note 20 infra and accompanying
text.
10. Appendixes B, C, and D provide a list of cases scored for the 1962, 1963 and
1964 Terms respectively. Those decisions which cover more than one issue are also
noted as are those judgments in which so-called "libertarians" are found on opposite sides.
10a. Using a much different approach, Schubert has rated Goldberg's "libertarian"
affinities during this term as less strong than those of Douglas, Black, Warren, and
Brennan in that order. See Schubert, Report and Analysis of the 1962 Term Predictions, in JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 582 (Schubert, ed. 1964).
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votes. 11 In Schubert's judgment, an Index of Interagreement of
seventy per cent is high, an Index of sixty to sixty-nine per cent
is moderate, and an Index below sixty per cent is low. The aims
and techniques that underlie this study differ from Schubert's only
in that we are: (1) coding "issues" rather than "votes"; and (2)
concentrating on the voting patterns of one Justice in relation to
his colleagues, rather than formulating generalizations about all nine
Justices in interaction with one another. Thus, our Index was
obtained by dividing the number of Mr. Justice Goldberg's joint
participations into the number of his joint agreements. The application of this Index to the selected cases taken from the 1962 Term
shows that Goldberg had a startlingly high interagreement quotient
with Black, Douglas, Warren, and Brennan, a moderate kinship
with White, and little in common with the others.
TABLE B
INDEX OF !NTERAGREEMENT FOR MR. JUSTICE GOI.DBERG, 1962 TERM

Brennan
Douglas
Warren
Black.
White
Stewart
Clark
Harlan

Participations

Agreements

24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24

24
21
21
20
15
11
11
6

Percentage
Agreement
100

88
88
83
63
46
46
25

In the 1963 Term, twenty-three cases including thirty-five issues
were found to be appropriate for our purposes. The strength of
each Justice's "libertarian" credo is as follows:
TABLE C
LIBERTARIAN REsPONSES, 1963 TER.>J
Participations
Douglas
Goldberg
Black
Brennan
Warren
Stewart
White
Clark
Harlan

30
33
32
30
33
30
28
32
32

Libertarian Responses

Percentage

27
28
26
21
21

90
85
81
70

14
6

47
46
19

1

3

13

64

Justice Goldberg's "libertarian" predispositions which were evident in the 1962 Term continued substantially unchanged during
11. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 91 (1959).
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the 1963 session. In this regard, his record of consistency was
matched by those of Black and Douglas, the latter having proven
himself to be more amenable to the personal rights at issue than
his colleagues in both of these years. The Chief Justice, on the other
hand, showed a sharp falling off in his civil liberties commitment,
having descended from a peak of ninety-two to sixty-four per cent.
Mr. Justice Brennan, to a lesser extent, moved in a similar direction. Among the "non-libertarians" of the 1962 Term, Mr. Justice
White, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, occupied a middle position
on our continuum, while Justices Clark and Harlan became far
more "authority-oriented" than they had been. It is obvious that
during this term several issues were presented which tended to undermine the solidarity of the "libertarian" faction. The nature of
these controversies also caused the others to become even more
widely spread along the spectrum than had heretofore been the
case. How this increasing diffusion of the Court affected Mr. Justice
Goldberg's joint assents is reflected in the following table:
TABLED
MR. JUSTICE

Douglas
Brennan
·warren
Black
White
Stewart
Clark
Harlan

INDEX OF lNTERAGREEMENT FOR

GOLDBERG,

Participations

Agreements

28

26

30

25

1963 TERM

Percentage
Agreement
93
83

33

26

30

20

28
29

16
16

31
31

6

57
55
19

4

13

79
67

The application of the Index of Interagreement to these data
finds Goldberg's intense bond with Douglas, Brennan, and Warren
continuing into 1963, while his link with his fellow Kennedy appointee, Mr. Justice White, was no longer of consequence. The
most significant insight that is captured in these statistics, however,
can be gleaned from a close inspection of Goldberg's ties with
Black and the Chief Justice. Justice Black, as has been seen, maintained his civil liberties orientation in 1963, while the Chief Justice
adopted a far more "balanced" view in adjudicating these issues.
Yet Goldberg's attachment to attitudes expressed by the Chief Justice was stronger than was his acceptance of Black's ideas; indeed,
his sixty-seven per cent affiliation with the latter was only at the
"moderate" level of cohesion. Clearly, Goldberg's conception of
valid "libertarianism" varied appreciably from Black's notions during this term.

308

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 65:l!0l

Turning to the 1964 session, twenty-six cases containing thirtyfour issues appear to qualify for consideration.
TABLE E
LIBERTARIAN REsPONSES, 1964 TERM
Participations
Douglas
Black
Goldberg
Warren
Brennan
Stewart
White
Clark
Harlan

34
33
34
31
33
32
33
33
33

Libertarian Responses
29
22
22
18
16
12
11
11
6

Percentage
85
67
65
58
48
38
33
33
18

Of the Justices who, in 1962, gave overwhelming support to individual rights, only Douglas had managed to hold his ground.
Goldberg and Black still took an "anti-societal" position two-thirds
of the time, but their commitments had obviously abated somewhat.11a The decline of "libertarianism" was most evident in the
cases of Warren and Brennan; indeed, the latter was far closer to
Stewart, White, and Clark than he was to Douglas. One can say
without dispute that there was no civil liberties bloc during the
1964 Term.
Surely one might expect this diffusion in coping with civil
liberties controversies to leave its imprint on the propensities of
Justices to align themselves with their brethren. This expectation
is fulfilled when one considers the data on interagreement for the
1964 session.
TABLE F
INDEX OF INTERAGREEMENT FOR MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, 1964 TERM

Warren
Brennan
Douglas
Clark
White
Stewart
Harlan
Black

Participations

Agreements

Percentage
Agreement

31
33
34
32
32
32
32
32

28
28
25
23
22
22
19
15

90
85
74
72
69
69
59
47

The Index of Interagreement illustrates the fact that Goldberg
again exhibited a high degree of affinity with Justices Douglas, Warlla. Spaeth, through the use of Guttman scaiing, has concluded that, "[i]n the 1963
and 1964 terms, Goldberg's support of civil liberties was exceeded only by Justice
Douglas." See SPAETH, THE WARREN COURT 28 (1966). This generalization is clearly not
consistent with the 1964 Term analysis herein presented.
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ren, and Brennan. Although Brennan voted less than fifty per cent
of the time for a "pro-libertarian" result, he still agreed with Goldberg eighty-five per cent of the time. Obviously, these two members
of the Court must have voted together in opposition to the civil
liberties views of others; furthermore, it must be remembered that
Goldberg himself voiced "libertarian" sentiments only sixty-five
per cent of the time. The break between Goldberg and Black
reached a crescendo during this term. Each continued to support
civil libertarian claims, although in a less intense manner than
before, but their Index of Interagreement points up a real ideological hostility between them. Note also the extraordinarily high rate
of concurrence between Goldberg and Clark and, indeed, Goldberg's moderate support for attitudes expressed by White and
Stewart. What had happened, evidently, was that the "anti-authoritarian" philosophies of Black and Goldberg were functioning in
an inverse relationship; each was resisting the other's "libertarian"
sorties. Only this opposition to Black's brand of civil liberties can
explain Goldberg's new-found affinity with the voting habits of
Mr. Justice Clark, whose "societal" predilections had been manifest
throughout these three terms.
Thus far, our analysis of Goldberg's attitudes on civil liberties
questions has stressed the evolution of these sentiments as compared
to those of others and as gauged against an abstract "freedom v. authority" model. A summary of the results obtained over the entire
three terms will be useful in assessing the total picture. Beginning
first with "libertarianism," a statistically more meaningful expression of each Justice's affiliation with this doctrine may be attained by dividing the total number of "civil libertarian" choices of
each Justice by the total number of participations.
TABLE G
1962-64 TERMS

LIBERTARIAN REsPONSES,

Participations
Douglas
Goldberg
Black
Warren
Brennan
White
Stewart
Clark
Harlan

88
91
89
88
87
85
86
89
89

Libertarian Responses
80
71
69
61
58
36
34
25
10

Percentage
91
78
78
69
67
42
40
28
11

The Court was clearly divided during these three terms into
two competing factions. The first, ranging from Douglas to Brennan, espoused a general commitment to the "libertarian" ideology.
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With respect to Warren and Brennan, this li~kage could be classified as moderate, but nonetheless significant. As for the other four
members of the Court, the differences between them were clear-cut
at times, but each evidently rejected the idea that "libertarianism"
is a value to be prized above "authoritarianism," at least so far as
our sample of issues is concerned.
A three-term analysis of Mr. Justice Goldberg's joint participations and policy agreements yields the following results:
TABLE H
MR. JUSTICE

INDEX OF lNTERAGREEMENT FOR

Brennan
Warren
Douglas
Black
White
Stewart
Clark
Harlan

GOLDBERG,

1962-64 TERMS

Participations

Agreements

87
88
86
86
84
85
88
87

77
75
72
55
53
49
41
29

Percentage
Agreement

89
85
84
64
63
58
47

33

The startling fact revealed by these figures is that the GoldbergBlack Index of Interagreement was only a rather tepid sixty-four
per cent. A review of the statistics for each of the three terms shows
that this moderate agreement between them was largely the product
of their 1964 schism. Yet, the two were less than one percentage
point apart in their devout "libertarianism" during these three
sessions. The cleavage between them which is indicated by their
interagreement quotient had developed to such classic proportions
that Goldberg's ties for the three terms to an "anti-libertarian"
(White) were on an approximate par with his affinity for Black's
views. A second important observation culled from these data is
that Goldberg's interagreement with the two so-called "moderate
libertarians" (Warren and Brennan) was even more pronounced
than his three-term alliance with a fellow "arch libertarian" (Douglas). The disparity in the interagreement figures is very slight indeed, but, significantly, it is largely the product of 1964 decisions.
One might hypothesize that during this last year of Goldberg's
tenure on the bench, both Black and Douglas indulged in "libertarian" sallies which were unacceptable to his more moderate posture.
The quantification of variables is of little help in trying to
assess the delicate shadings of opinion which separated Mr. Justice
Goldberg from those of his colleagues who shared his "anti-authoritarian" predispositions. One must inquire into the dynamics of the
so-called "libertarian bloc." Unfortunately, in the space available,

December 1966]

Mr. Justice Goldberg

311

it is not feasible to do more than highlight the major strands of
agreement and disagreement that seem to characterize Goldberg's
relations with each of the members of this bloc.
II.

GOLDBERG-BRENNAN

Statistics have told us that, of all the "libertarians," Mr. Justice
Brennan most often aligned himself with Goldberg. They agreed
eighty-nine per cent of the time. It is also true, however, that Goldberg was somewhat more prone to respond to alleged individual
rights than was Brennan. Indeed, a review of the cases yields the
interesting fact that on no issue did Brennan support a "libertarian"
result in opposition to Goldberg's preference for a "societal" value.
The key difference between the two appears to center around
the rights of the individual in the courtroom. Six of the ten issues
which found them in disagreement were related to the defendant's
rights in a criminal proceeding. The most dramatic instance of this
divergence of opinion concerned the use of television during both
a pretrial hearing and the trial itself. The petitioner was Billie Sol
Estes, the Texas financier who had been found guilty of swindling.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, agreeing with a majority of five, 12 voted to
reverse on the ground that the use of television had "set it apart in
the public mind as an extraordinary case," 13 and that, therefore,
due process had been abridged. Mr. Justice Brennan, on the other
hand, joined Mr. Justice Stewart in claiming that certiorari had
been granted only to consider the question whether a judge, even
during the trial of a well-known personality, could allow television
facilities to be used under carefully circumscribed conditions. Justice Brennan believed the question must be answered in the affirmative.
The substance of the controversy presented in Estes, however,
did not end there. Adhering to an argument presented by the Chief
Justice in a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg espoused
the notion that under no condition could television be countenanced in a court of law. While some might argue that the introduction of this medium into the courtroom could serve the useful
purpose of educating the public, Mr. Chief Justice Warren succinctly noted that "the function of trial is not to provide an educational experience," but to illuminate the truth.14 Justice Brennan, on the other hand, supported Justice Stewart's contention that
12. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
13. Id. at 5!18.
14. Id. at 575.
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it was imprudent to escalate into a constitutional rule the policy
determination that the use of television was unwise.
A second important case which illustrates Goldberg's desire
to pioneer new constitutional ground rules for the courtroom involved Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi. The Court held that
Barnett did not have a right to a jury trial in a criminal contempt
proceeding.15 Of the "libertarians," only Brennan was able to subscribe to this view. In a highly scholarly dissent, Goldberg argued
that a thorough investigation of the history of criminal contempt
proceedings tried before a judge made it clear that, until relatively
recent times, no one had believed that non-jury procedures could
ever be used to mete out anything but trivial penalties; since Barnett, if convicted, would be adjudged guilty of a most serious crime,
it was proper for the Court to shield him in advance by assuring
him a trial by jury.
In a somewhat novel footnote to the majority opinion in Barnett,
Mr. Justice Clark issued the following caveat to the lower courts:
don't be too harsh on this man because some members of our tribunal believe that only trivial penalties can be exacted by judges in
contempt proceedings.16 It is hard to believe that Clark would have
gone out of his way to announce this dictum if only Goldberg and
those who shared his opinion (Warren and Douglas) adhered to
this position. Quite possibly there were members of the majority
who also held this view. If so, Brennan, because of his "libertarianism," is a likely suspect. This assumption, if valid, may suggest
an interesting difference between Brennan and Goldberg. Brennan
might well have believed that because the question of the severity
of penalties issued in contempt cases had not been certified to the
Supreme Court for adjudication, it was therefore the Justices'
responsibility merely to issue a warning in the hope that a warning
would be sufficient. This approach, of course, would afford the
Court the opportunity of avoiding a most difficult constitutional
question. Goldberg, on the other hand, pursued a more activist
course by meeting the issue squarely so that the lower courts would
be more clearly apprised of the law.
This cleavage between Goldberg and Brennan as to the application of due process considerations to criminal proceedings may be
illustrated by reference to two other Supreme Court decisions. In
the first of these, Goldberg went on record as opposing, except in
the most pressing circumstances, the adjudication of a contempt
15. United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
16. Id. at 695 n.12.
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charge before the judge who had issued the initial citation.17 The
second case involved an allegation by a Negro petitioner that no
Negro had ever served on a petit jury in Talladega County, Alabama, and that this discrimination was a product of Alabama's use
of the peremptory strike system to eliminate members of his race
from such juries.18 A majority of the Justices, including Brennan,
found that the petitioner had not satisfied his burden of proving
that state officials had indeed perverted the peremptory challenge
to this end. Goldberg, dissenting with Warren and Douglas, argued
that once it had been shown that no Negro had ever served on a
petit jury within the county, a prima fade case of discrimination
had been established and the burden of proof therefore shifted to
the state, which was "in the better position to develop the facts as
to how the exclusion came about." 19
It would be a mistake to emphasize these disparities in constitutional philosophy. When a concurrence level of eighty-nine per
cent has been established, it should be obvious that one is dealing
with two men who use the same pair of bifocals. It therefore is
important to devote at least as much attention to the significant
agreements between the two as to their moments of discord. Two
holdings are especially useful for this purpose because they show
other members of the Court moving in several divergent directions
while Brennan and Goldberg stay together.
The first of these is Jacobellis v. Ohio. 20 Nico Jacobellis was
convicted of showing what the courts of Ohio believed to be an
obscene movie, "The Lovers." His contention was simply that the
film was not obscene and that he had thus been deprived of a first
amendment privilege. Two of the "libertarians," Black and Douglas,
argued that allegedly obscene movies could not be proscribed by
any procedures. Neither Brennan nor Goldberg could accept this
sweeping approach, but they did agree that appellant's first amendment rights had been violated. In this respect, the four were joined
by White, concurring in the result, and by Stewart, who wrote a
separate opinion expressing his individual views. 21 On the other
hand, one "libertarian,'' Mr. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Clark and Harlan, thought that Jacobellis could be found
guilty and, in addition, drastically disagreed with the others regard17. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964).
18. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
19. Id. at 240. A fifth case of the same species as those discussed above is United
States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
20. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
21. His opinion, however, in no way represented a departure from the GoldbergBrennan thesis prese:ited below. See text accompanying note 23 infra.
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ing the role of the Court in obscenity cases. Mr. Chief Justice Warren
believed that the Supreme Court should not make a de novo review
of every book or movie found by the lower courts to be obscene,
but, rather, that it should invest lower courts with considerable latitude in applying the standards for obscenity which the Court had established in the Roth and Alberts decisions. 22 Furthermore, it was
Warren's view that when the majority in Roth and Alberts had
stated that allegedly obscene works were to be evaluated in terms of
"contemporary community standards," the guidelines to be used by
the lower courts were the norms of each community desiring to
enforce obscenity laws. To Goldberg and Brennan, each of these
contentions flew in the face of the principle that "it is, after all,
a national Constitution we are expounding."23 In a nutshell, this
tandem agreed that laws criminally punishing those who disseminated obscene materials were valid, that the definition of obscenity
embraced national cultural values, that it was the Supreme Court's
function to make a determination on its own as to the obscenity of
each work questioned, and that "The Lovers" was not obscene.
Perhaps the most controversial decision of the 1964 Term was
the Court's voiding of a Connecticut law which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offense. 24 Among the "libertarians," only
Black could not accept Mr. Justice Douglas' assertion that "the
First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion" and that the police could not constitutionally "search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale
signs . . ." that the law had been violated. 25 But Goldberg, in a
concurring opinion in which he was joined by Brennan and Warren,
went much further than this. He stated that the due process provision of the fourteenth amendment protects personal rights which
could be termed "fundamental" regardless of whether they could
be buttressed by the specifics set out in the Bill of Rights. This
conviction was flatly rejected by Justices Black and Douglas, who
saw in this a resurrection of Lochner v. New York. 26 Finally, both
Goldberg and Brennan rejected Black's and Douglas' belief that due
process contained in the fourteenth amendment "incorporates" the
specifics of the first eight amendments. 27 Griswold, then, like ]acobel22. Roth v. United States; Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
23. 378 U.S. at 195.
24. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. Id. at 483, 485.
26. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
27. Mr. Justice Black's views are articulated in his dissenting opinion in Griswold,
381 U.S. at 507, and Mr. Justice· Douglas' views are outlined in Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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lis, illustrates the middle position that Goldberg and Brennan sometimes occupied while other members of the "libertarian bloc" split
in various directions.

III.

GOLDBERG-WARREN

The relationship between the value choices of the Chief Justice and Goldberg's "libertarian" commitment is very similar to the
relationship benveen Brennan and Goldberg. Like Brennan, Warren attained a somewhat lower score (sixty-nine per cent) than Goldberg on the "liberty-authority" continuum, while exhibiting a
startlingly positive concurrence ratio with Goldberg (eighty-five per
cent). Warren and Goldberg disagreed on only thirteen relevant
issues, with Warren being scored as favorable to a "societal" result
in ten of these. However, none of the three questions on which
Goldberg assumed an "anti-libertarian" position contrary to that
of the Chief Justice involved major civil liberties issues. In one
such case, containing two issues, petitioner had been convicted of
income tax evasion through the use of evidence obtained in part
pursuant to a Treasury Department policy which offered delinquent taxpayers the option of escaping criminal prosecution by
freely disclosing their violations.28 While the evidence clearly indicated that the taxpayer had confessed only so as to perpetrate a
fraud on federal officials, Justices Warren, Douglas, and Black,
arguing that the admission of guilt had been induced, believed that
the use of this information violated the self-incrimination provision
of the fifth amendment. To the majority, including Goldberg,
petitioner's confession was not only voluntary, but was also calculated to undermine the basic purpose of the program-the avoidance of criminal penalties. Moreover, the majority rejected the
minority's contention that subsequently discovered inaccuracies in
the testimony of an important trial witness would necessarily entitle
the defendant to a new trial, especially since no allegation had been
made that the witness had committed perjury.
The second decision in which Warren took a more "libertarian"
approach than Goldberg raised the question of probable cause for
a search warrant.29 Speaking for a majority of seven which upheld
the warrant, Goldberg noted that the warrant used the phrases
"upon observations made by me" and "upon personal knowledge"
in designating some of the sources of the incriminating information. 30 Warren, dissenting with Douglas, tried to show that, taken
28. Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963).
29. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
30. Id. at ll0.
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as a whole, the warrant was a tissue of hearsay because no particular
item of information was identified as within the first-hand knowledge of the officer. To Goldberg, this was a mechanical reading of
the warrant; hearsay might well serve as the basis for establishing
probable cause if the circumstances so required.
What are the issues on which Goldberg and Warren disagreed,
with Goldberg cast in the role of a civil liberties advocate? Of the
ten constitutional questions, six involved the right of free speech.
The most drastic split between Goldberg and Warren stemmed from
their conceptions of the role of the Supreme Court in dealing with
the suppression of obscenity. Jacobellis contained three of the six
first amendment issues which found Goldberg and the Chief Justice
on opposite sides. A strong sense of the pragmatic runs through
Warren's dissent in this case: What criteria, he asked, can the Court
use to enunciate a set of national moral standards? How can the
Justices expect local courts to divine these guidelines? How can
the Supreme Court institute a de novo review of every piece of
alleged smut that lower courts believe to be proscribable under
Roth-Alberts? Who are nine men to say that a movie which contains
an implication of mouth-genital sexual gratification is not obscene?31
Goldberg, on the other hand, placed emphasis on the concept of
free speech as a national constitutional privilege which protects all
Americans no matter where they live. If it is to be the responsibility
of the Supreme Court to define obscenity, he said, then the Justices
could not simply lay down a formula and let the states act as administrative agencies in their application of that formula. Free
speech is too pre-eminent a value in our system to allow such latitude.
This priority given to free speech when it is weighed against the
government's alleged responsibility to protect the public against
deleterious consequences of speech is again illustrated in the Goldberg-Warren cleavage over the constitutionality of state laws dealing
with libel suits. It was Goldberg's belief that a public official could
not recover damages from a private citizen who had libeled him, no
matter how malicious the intent of the speaker.32 To allow recovery,
he felt, would be to place the prerogatives of public criticism in the
hands of "a jury's evaluation of the speaker's state of mind." 33 It
followed from this that a state law which branded the libeling of a
31. For some relevant comments on the travails of "The Lovers" before various
motion picture censor boards, see CARMEN, MOVIES, CENSORSHIP AND THE LAw 87, 192,
268, 283 (1966).
32. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
33. Id. at 300.
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public official a crime was also unconstitutional even as applied
to a person who knew his statement to be false. 34 The Chief Justice
believed that a state might well determine that "the use of the
known lie as a tool is at once at odds with the premises of democratic government," and that "calculated falsehood falls into that
class of utterances which 'are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.' " 35 This is precisely the kind
of argument that Goldberg had espoused in his split with Black and
Douglas over a state's right to suppress obscenity. It is extremely
important to note that Goldberg would give citizens greater leeway
in criticizing public officers than he would give the writer or filmmaker in exploring man's sex life.
The final case which shows Goldberg and Warren on opposite
sides on matters of first amendment coverage stemmed from a State
Department order refusing to allow a citizen to travel to Cuba to
inspect for himself the ways in which Fidel Castro was leading his
people toward "social justice."36 It is true, Warren wrote for the
majority, that there are few inhibitions on travel which would not
decrease one's access to knowledge; nonetheless, the Chief Executive, through his agent, might reasonably find in this instance that
the United States policy of quarantine toward Cuba would be
better enforced if inquisitive Americans confined their inquiries to
newspaper reading. In dissent, Goldberg pointed out that, if the
State Department could keep Americans from going to Cuba because of its communist ties, it could, on similar grounds, also keep
them from going to any other communist state. Given the fact that
the right to travel is an essential attribute of free speech, a more
definite showing of a national emergency would be necessary to
justify this restriction of an individual's right to obtain information.
Despite their differences, both Goldberg and Warren accepted
the "libertarian" ideology, and this created a bond between them
which was as important as the bond between Goldberg and Brennan.
In Griswold, for example, Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan joined
hands not only in widening the first amendment's new-found protection of privacy rights, but also in the view that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment could be used to strike down
governmental infringements of personal liberties that were thought
to "shock the conscience" of our collective citizenry, as perceived
34. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
35. Id. at 75.
36. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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by the Justices. Moreover, Warren joined forces with Goldberg
more often than not in resisting Brennan's "societal" tendencies in
cases dealing with the courtroom protections to be afforded the accused. For example, the Chief Justice chose a "libertarian" posture
in deciding the questions tendered to the Court in Estes and in the
determination of the jury discrimination question presented in
Swain. In addition, he concurred in Goldberg's trenchant defense of
Ross Barnett's right to a trial by jury, but, also in accord with Goldberg's arguments, he resisted the Black-Douglas notion that not
even trivial penalties could be assessed by a judge in criminal contempt proceedings. This increasingly close relationship between
Goldberg and Warren was best illustrated in the 1964 Term when
the Justices resolved twenty-three issues which found the "libertarians" at odds with one another. Of these, Goldberg concurred
with the Chief Justice in all but three, and with Brennan in all but
five. As has already been intimated, then, the somewhat more
intense civil libertarian predispositions which influenced Goldberg
when contrasted with Brennan and Warren constituted but a minor
schism when compared with the major discord which appeared to
exist between Goldberg and both Black and Douglas.
IV.

GOLDBERG-DOUGLAS

Mr. Justice Douglas established himself as the "libertarian par
excellence" of the 1962-64 period. He voted against the use of
society's powers to order the actions of its people in ninety-one per
cent of the pertinent constitutional questions litigated before the
Court during those years, putting him well above Goldberg's secondplace seventy-eight per cent. Indeed, Douglas' commitment to the
personal rights of the individual placed him ahead of all of his colleagues in each of these three terms.
The interagreement quotient between Goldberg and Douglas
during this time was an intense eighty-four per cent. This ratio,
however, ranks only third in Mr. Justice Goldberg's hierarchy of
agreement with the other "libertarian" Justices. While Goldberg's
civil liberties inclinations, in terms of percentages, placed him as
distant from Douglas as he was from Warren and Brennan, an
analysis of the data on a term-by-term basis reveals some interesting
facts. Goldberg's affinity for Douglas' ideological views shows a
sharp falling off during the 1964 Term. From a remarkable concurrence ratio of ninety-three per cent in the 1963 session, their
interagreement quotient plummeted to a still significantly positive
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seventy-four per cent one year later. On the other hand, Goldberg's
concurrence with Warren jumped from seventy-nine to ninety per
cent during the same period of time. Furthermore, Goldberg's and
Douglas' adherence to civil liberties values also shows some interterm fluctuation; the 1964 Term, for example, found the spread between them to be a surprisingly wide twenty percentage points.
It is submitted that there is no single class of controversies that
accounts for whatever disparities exist in their "libertarian" attitudes.
Throughout Goldberg's first two years as a Supreme Court Justice,
he and Douglas parted company in their interpretation of constitutional rights of the individual on only five occasions. It has been
noted that, in Barnett, Douglas wanted to divest judges of all power
to mete out penalties in criminal contempt cases.37 It was also his
belief that no movie could be suppressed merely because it was
thought to be obscene.38 Furthermore, Douglas was the only member of the Court who felt that a Sunday closing law exempting
from its applicability those who keep another day as their Sabbath
could be challenged on first amendment grounds. 39 On the other
hand, as an example of their agreement during the 1962 and 1963
Terms, Goldberg and Douglas joined alone in dissent (the only occasion on which this occurred in the cases coded) to protest the
manner in which district lines for the House of Representatives were
allegedly gerrymandered in New York City.40 It was their opinion
that the state legislature had used race as a guideline so that Harlem
would have its own representative, and that this contravened the
principle of equal protection. Nor can it be forgotten that it was
Goldberg and Douglas, joined only by Warren, who found segregation of the races by privately owned "public accommodations" to be
prohibited by the fourteenth amendment. 41
During the 1964 Term, however, Justices Goldberg and Douglas
disagreed in eight of the thirty-three decisions in which they jointly
participated. In the more important of these disagreements, it appeared that Goldberg usually was unwilling to follow Douglas in the
latter's determination to apply rules of law to varying kinds of conduct regardless of the circumstances. In Freedman v. Maryland, 42 for
instance, Douglas espoused the notion that movies are entitled to be
as free from the yoke of the censor as are any of the other mass
37. It is true that Douglas joined with Goldberg in bis dissenting opinion, but he
also concurred in Black's more "libertarian" protest.
38. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
39. Arlan's Dep't Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962).
40. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
41. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
42. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
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media. Thus, he said, "I would put an end to all forms and types
of censorship ...." 43 Goldberg, however, evidently believing that
motion pictures presented special problems which are not inherent
in the dissemination of the written word, took the position that a
limited form of censorship circumscribed by the guarantees of due
process could be constitutionally upheld. With respect to the guarantees of the fourth amendment, Douglas and Black dissented
against the majority's holding that the Mapp rule 44 did not operate
retrospectively upon cases that had been finalized prior to the
Court's decision in Mapp. 45 The consensus among the majority Jus•
tices, including Mr. Justice Goldberg, was that there was no all-embracing principle of retroactivity even as to the application of the
Bill of Rights, but that emphasis must be placed on matters of
"public policy" and "a consideration of 'particular relations . . .
and particular conduct . . . .' " 46 There was surely a substantial
difference between applying retrospectively an expansion of the
right to counsel, where the availability of legal counsel could
have meant the difference between conviction and acquittal, and
the Mapp rule, the retroactive application of which would free
thousands of known guilty parties. To Douglas, such a distinction
was "more like law-making than construing the Constitution,"47
and indicated "a disparaging view" of fourth amendment liberties. 48
Two other controversies are also illustrative of the GoldbergDouglas cleavage. The first involved the question whether the "one
man-one vote" principle of apportionment necessitated the use of
single-member districts. 49 Eight members of the Court voted to uphold a system by which seats in a state legislature were apportioned
among counties according to population, but in which all the lawmakers coming from multi-district counties were to be chosen by a
county-wide vote. Douglas, on the other hand, thought this to be an
"invidious discrimination" because a person living in a district contained in a populous county had to share his vote with all members
of the county, while one living in a sparsely settled county voted
only for a single-district representative. To put Douglas' argument
succinctly: an apportionment system could not use homesite as a
criterion for varying schemes of representation.
In the second illustrative decision, the Court unanimously
43. Id. at 62.
44. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Angelet v. Fay, 381 U.S. 654 (1965).
46. Linkletter v. Walker, supra note 45, at 627.
47. Id. at 649.
48. Id. at 645.
49. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
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voided a Florida statute making it a crime for an unmarried couple
to occupy habitually the same room in the nighttime if one was
Negro and the other Caucasion.50 This, said Mr. Justice White, was
an irrational classification in light of the demands of the equal
protection clause. If his opinion had said nothing more, there
would have been no cause for disagreement. But White found it
necessary to point out that not all laws using race as a criterion for
determining state regulatory policies were invalid; such laws would
be upheld if found to be "necessary" to "the accomplishment of a
permissible state policy." 51 This last statement rankled Justices
Douglas and Stewart. What valid legislative act, they asked, could
be passed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment which would make
the color of a man's skin a standard of criminal conduct? Until
this time, Goldberg's policy notions had led him to oppose any
public action that even smacked of racism, as is evidenced by his
dissents in the Harlem district case and in the Alabama peremptory
challenge decision. Why then did he not concur in Douglas' "libertarian" foray? No one, of course, can say for certain, but the general
trend of Goldberg's decisions during this period leads one to believe that he was beginning to chafe ever so slightly against the
idea that a civil right is always a right no matter what claims society
makes upon its citizenry. To be more specific, it is quite possible
that Goldberg saw Douglas' argument as an attack on such precedents as the Japanese exclusion cases. 52
One of the decisions of the Court that requires close examination as one considers the variations in recent judicial behavior is
Griswold v. Connecticut; 53 few cases seem to tell us as much about
each of the Justices. In writing his opinion for the majority, Douglas
denounced the role of the Supreme Court as a "super-legislature."
It is not the task of the Court, he said, to assess "the wisdom, need,
and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs,
or social conditions." 54 It was this Holmesian expression of selfrestraint which led Goldberg to proclaim, for the first and only
time, a "libertarian" commitment contrary to Douglas' convictions.
For the latter, due process guaranteed no substantive rights other
than those derived from a particular right set out in the first eight
amendments. For Goldberg, the "liberty of contract" once thought
to be guaranteed by substantive due process was undoubtedly obso50.
51.
52.
States,
5!l.
54.

McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
Id. at 196.
See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
!l81 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 482.
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lete, just as it was for Douglas; but Goldberg did not construe this
to mean that due process could be characterized in a substantive
sense so as to encompass only those personal liberties set out in the
Bill of Rights. It was this conviction which led him to embark on
his famous journey into the ninth amendment "thicket" in order to
prove his point. It is possible that this resort to a constitutional
clause long thought to have been interred was not Goldberg's finest
hour on the Court, but it did demonstrate his displeasure with the
idea that due process is only shorthand for the Bill of Rights.

V.

GOLDBERG-BLACK

Our data indicates that the divergence of opinion between Goldberg and Black should provide the keenest insight into the dynamics
of Goldberg's civil liberties predispositions while a member of the
Supreme Court. No one can doubt that Goldberg and Black were
equally intense in their determination to rescue the individual from
alleged infringements of personal rights. Statistics show that each
scored seventy-eight per cent in his "libertarian" responses over the
three-term period. Furthermore, their near congruence was all the
more amazing when examined on a term-by-term basis. During
each of the three sessions that Goldberg sat on the bench, his "libertarianism" never varied from Black's by more than four percentage
points. Indeed, when Black's "anti-societal" tendencies suffered a
radical falling-off during the 1964 Term, a similar change was evident in Goldberg's policy choices.
It has already been noted, however, that the interagreement
ratios for these two men were not marked by such congruence. After
an interagreement quotient of eighty-three per cent in 1962, the two
disagreed on ten separate issues during the 1963 Term for a "moderate" cohesiveness of sixty-seven per cent, compared to the Goldberg-Warren alliance of seventy-nine per cent and the GoldbergDouglas quotient of ninety-three. This rate of dissatisfaction was
merely a precursor of the events of the 1964 Term, when Goldberg
disagreed with Black more often than with any of his brethren.
As a matter of fact, their interagreement score was an insignificant
forty-seven per cent, compared with a seventy-four per cent agreement between Goldberg and Douglas and the even higher percentages Goldberg attained with Brennan and Warren.
There were two cases decided during the 1962 Term which help
to establish a significant disparity in thinking between Black and
Goldberg. Each case involved alleged invasions of fourth amend-
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ment freedoms. In the first of these, 55 a federal officer with a minifon
hidden on his person recorded a bribe offer made to him, and this
evidence was then used to convict the speaker. The majority, with
Black concurring, affirmed the conviction. In dissent, Justices Goldberg, Brennan, and Douglas argued that electronic devices, because
of the serious intrusion they make into rights of privacy, should be
subject to the fourth amendment limitations on unreasonable
searches and seizures. Unless warrants were required in these cases,
the dissenters claimed, the individual would have no protection
against invasions by third parties whose presence could never be
determined.
In the second case, 56 California police officers, acting without
a warrant, used a passkey to enter petitioner's apartment, arrested
him on suspicion of violating narcotics laws, and subsequently discovered marijuana on the premises. A majority of five, including
Black, found that probable cause existed for making the arrest and
the ensuing search without a warrant because incriminating statements had been made by informers and also because the police had
observed several of petitioner's associates dealing in marijuana. According to the majority, there was not an illegal "breaking" without
notice, for the police were reasonably certain that the petitioner
had been apprised of their surveillance and might well conceal or
destroy the incriminating evidence if they did not act immediately. To Mr. Justice Goldberg and the other "libertarians," this
was an "unannounced police intrusion into a private home." There
was nothing in the record to show that the petitioner was about
to destroy the evidence in his possession because it was not clear that
the petitioner knew that the police were following him. Indeed, if
police actions in the instant case could be justified by the mere
possibility, supposedly based on experience, that evidence would be
destroyed, the police could break into a suspect's home practically
at their whim.
The Justices were called upon to construe the scope of fourth
amendment protections in only three other controversies during
the subsequent two terms. 57 In each of these cases, Black rejected
what he conceived to be an overly broad view of these liberties.i1s
In the only one of these cases in which Black and Goldberg agreed,
55. Lopez v. United States, 1173 U.S. 427 (1963).
56. Ker v. California, 1174 U.S. 211 (1968).
57. This figure excludes Linkletter and Angelet, which involved the retroactivity
of already established constitutional rights.
58. Aguilar v. Texas, 1178 U.S. 108 (1964); United States v. Ventresca, !ISO U.S.
102 (1965); One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 698 (1965).
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they joined the Court in upholding a search warrant based partially
on hearsay because there was some evidence that the officer who had
obtained the warrant possessed sufficient first-hand knowledge to
verify the hearsay. 59 Unfortunately, because Mr. Justice Black concurred silently in all five of these search and seizure cases, no overt
explication can be found in any decision rendered during these
terms which helps us to understand why Black, the staunch civil
liberties advocate, had been content with the use of electronic devices to obtain evidence and the use of hearsay to establish probable
cause for arrests and searches.
Offsetting Black's "pro-societal" inclinations in the fourth
amendment cases was his uniquely "libertarian" orientation regarding the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings. The primary
example of this orientation is Jackson v. Denno, 60 in which a fiveman majority, including all of Black's "libertarian" brethren, held
that a jury entrusted with the power to decide innocence or guilt
could not also be permitted to determine the voluntariness of the
defendant's confession. Such a rule was required because there was
a serious threat that "matters pertaining to the defendant's guilt will
infect the jury's finding of fact bearing upon voluntariness...." 61
In addition, even if the jury disregarded the confession because of
coercion, one could hardly expect this same panel to suppress the
fact that the accused had, in reality, confessed. The Court's decision
contravened Black's devotion to the concept of trial by jury. This
new doctrine, he believed, seriously undercut the Founding Fathers'
abiding faith in the jury as the institution best equipped to decide
factual questions. However, despite his passion for the jury system,
Black still considered it the duty of reviewing courts to examine the
record and decide for themselves if confessions had been obtained
by illegal techniques. In the case at hand, he felt that due process
had been clearly violated by police officials, whereas the majority
had refused to consider the factual question of voluntariness.
The 1964 Term also contained a controversy which saw Black
split from his "libertarian" colleagues on somewhat similar
grounds. 62 In affirming a conviction for operating an illegal distillery, the Court upheld a federal statute establishing a presumption
of guilt if an accused could not explain his presence at such a distillery. Speaking for himself and six others, Justice Stewart found
that this portion of the law had been drafted because of the practical
59. United States v. Ventresca, supra note 58.
60. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
61. Id. at 383.
62. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).
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difficulties inherent in proving actual participation in the illegal
conduct. It was his view that considerable weight must be accorded
Congress in drawing conclusions from the behavior of individuals,
and that the "rationality of the connection 'between the fact proved
and the ultimate fact assumed'" was beyond doubt. 63 However,
Stewart did emphasize that if guilt had not been demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury need not convict even if an accused's
presence went unexplained. Black, the lone dissenter, stated that
federal officials had violated petitioner's right of trial by jury and
the guarantee of due process of law. In our constitutional system,
the jury's function as the sole judge of facts in criminal cases could
not be undermined by presumptions established by Congress. But,
even if Congress had the law-making capacity to create presumptions of guilt, it still did not follow that consistent with the guarantee of due process, the mere unexplained presence at a still, in
and of itself, necessarily constituted sufficient grounds for guilt.64
The issue which seems to exemplify best Black's and Goldberg's
divergent notions of "libertarianism" was the question in Bell v.
Maryland 65 whether racial segregation in privately owned public
accommodations violated the equal protection clause. The resolution
of the constitutional question presented in this case was obviously
very important for the entire country, but perhaps equally important was that it may well have had an incalculable impact upon
the future of "libertarianism" on the Court.
Petitioners had been found guilty in the courts of Maryland for
trespassing upon the premises of a restaurant which served whites
only. After ther request for relief had been denied by the Maryland
Court of Appeals, but before certiorari was granted, the state legislature passed a public accommodations statute making it obligatory
for owners of these establishments to serve members of all races on
an equal basis. By a vote of six to three, the Justices reversed the convictions, relying on the newly enacted state law despite Maryland's
general saving clause which was designed to protect state convictions from the common-law effect of supervening statutes.
Four members of the Court refused to accept this conclusion.
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring separately, found that Maryland
had made reference to the new law only to show why certiorari
ought not to be granted; furthermore, the issue of the state legisla63. Id. at 66.
64. Two other decisions of the same genre which found Black at odds with Goldberg were United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964), where Black opposed the
meting out of any penalties by judges in criminal contempt proceedings, and Boles T.
Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 (1964).
65. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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tion had been shunted aside during oral argument and conferences
because it was felt to have been frivolous. He then went on to find
the "apartheid" inherent in racial exclusion policies of public accommodations owners to be contrary to the fourteenth amendment.
Mr. Justice Black, on the other hand, speaking for himself and
Justices White and Harlan, agreed that the Court had made a
grievous error in not facing the equal protection problem squarely,
but reached a different conclusion than did Douglas. Referring first
to the matter of state action, he said that everyone agreed that a
state could not use its power to foist second-class rights on any
race. But the Maryland courts had not done this by merely enforcing the restaurant owner's prejudices against serving Negroes. As
for cases like Shelley v. Kraemer, 66 where the Justices had found
court enforced restrictive covenants to be unconstitutional state
action, Black claimed that, in reality, the Court had done nothing
more than protect federal rights guaranteed by the Civil Rights
Acts of 1866 and 1870. And, although the restaurant was licensed by
the city, the licensing involved no attempt to force policies of segregation upon property owners. Secondly, responding to the argument
that, irrespective of state involvement, the fourteenth amendment
was applicable to privately owned businesses which hold themselves
out to the public, Black merely noted that the Court ought not to
overthrow a veritable host of precedents that had been decided to
the contrary. It is at this point that his opinion is most balanced
and perceptive. Legislative bodies, subject to the influence of public
debate, could draw the lines necessary to set apart those private
activities so wrapped up in public service that they ought to be open
to all regardless of race. However, if the Court were to lay down an
inflexible constitutional rule on the subject, then the Congress
and state legislatures would be prevented from participating in the
formulation of these policies.
Of the five Justices who believed the passage of the new Maryland law to be sufficient grounds for reversal, only Goldberg and
Warren found it necessary to comment on the fourteenth amendment argument. In so doing, they joined Douglas in his opposition
to Black's contentions. To Goldberg, Black's position would bind
the Negro to a vestige of slavery which imposed upon him the limitations of a caste system. Goldberg inquired into the history of the
fourteenth amendment and concluded that its framers had intended
to provide Negroes with all the civil rights guaranteed to Caucasians.
Furthermore, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to
66. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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exercise a "social" rather than a "civil" right, because the raison
d'etre of segregated facilities did not lie in the implementation of
a property owner's personal biases, but, rather, resulted from his
determination to maximize profits. In concluding, Goldberg noted
that, no matter what the ·writers of this amendment intended,
Black's convictions could not be squared with the school integration
decisions which had shown racial segregation to be harmful to the
Negro as he attempted to improve his condition in our modern
society.
The impeccable dispassion of these opinions tends to obscure the
emotionally charged background of Bell v. Maryland. Southern states
were wracked with picketing, rioting, and even racial murders.
Sit-ins had become commonplace. The Senate was stalemated in
filibuster over the President's civil rights proposal. The Court was
faced with the question: what role should it play in resolving the
controversy? Although the premise of "libertarianism" is action on
behalf of alleged constitutional rights of the individual, Justice
Black, normally "libertarian," had taken an "authoritarian" stance
in this situation of crisis. What impact this shift may have had on
Goldberg and Black as ideological brethren can, perhaps, never be
known; yet, one thing is clear: the 1964 Term saw Goldberg move
further from Black than from any of his other colleagues.
The class of cases which, not surprisingly, appears to demonstrate best the intensity of the differences between Black and Goldberg involved the alleged civil rights of Negroes. Mr. Justice Black
had shown at an early time that he was not as willing as Goldberg
to cut through a mass of contradictory evidence in order to conclude that race was used as a criterion for legislation or other state
action and that, therefore, such action was invalid. 67 In two cases
decided the same day as Bell, Black refused to join his "libertarian"
friends in finding that the due process clause protected petitioners
against a state court judgment applying a trespass law retroactively
so as to make it applicable to their conduct, 68 and in ruling that a
deputy sheriff hired in a private capacity to enforce segregation was
engaged in unconstitutional state action. 69 And, in two cases decided during the 1964 Term, Black rejected both Goldberg's contention that an Alabama county had perverted its peremptory jury
challenge rule so as to screen out Negroes, 70 and Goldberg's position
in Cox v. Louisiana71 that city officials had duped civil rights picket67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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ers, contrary to due process, by telling them that they could legally
demonstrate and subsequently arresting them under a law forbidding disturbances in front of courthouses. Of course, there were
issues involving the rights of Negroes where Black reached a "libertarian" result, 72 but his overall approach to these matters was that
of a Harlan, not that of a Goldberg.
There was another key difference in constitutional philosophy
between Justices Goldberg and Black that was made evident in
1964 and 1965. When Goldberg believed the rights of the individual
to be in jeopardy, he was often more than willing to dispel precedent
to guarantee those rights. Both Barnett and Bell attest to this. On
the other hand, Black, like Douglas, could trace his roots, in so far
as judicial philosophy is concerned, to the 1930's when he saw
the power of the Supreme Court used to strike down legislation
which the Court believed to be radical or unwise. As a New Dealer,
he knew that judicial activism has its dangers as well as its blessings. When Goldberg formulated an expansive interpretation of
due process to strike down Connecticut's statute forbidding the use
of contraceptives, Black disagreed strongly. It was not for the courts
to invalidate laws which were believed to be "arbitary, capricious,
unreasonable, or oppressive"; such formulas were based on "natural
justice," and it was for legislatures, not for the Supreme Court, to
apply "natural justice."73 This same basis for disagreement appeared
earlier, in Jackson v. Denno, when Black accused his "libertarian"
brethren, among others, of scrapping New York's jury procedures
for determining the admissibility of confessions because such procedures were deemed to be unfair. He stated:
The Court appears to follow a judicial philosophy which has relied on that clause [due process] to strike down laws and procedures
in many fields because of a judicial belief that they are "unfair,"
are contrary to "the concept of ordered liberty," "shock the conscience" or come within various other vague but appealing catch
phrases.74
Again, in a lone dissent in Plymouth Sedan, he chastized his colleagues for grafting the exclusionary rule onto the fourth amendment: "I cannot agree that because we ourselves might believe the
practice of obtaining evidence in that manner 'shocks the conscience'
or is 'shabby' . . . we are . . . authorized by the Constitution to
prevent its use as evidence." 75
'12. Black concurred in the reversal of the breach of peace and obstructing public
passage convictions in Cox v. Louisiana, supra note '11.
']3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511 (1965).
'14. 3'18 U.S. 368, 40'1 (1964).
'15. 380 U.S. 693, '103 (1965).
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Yet if Black were persuaded that the Constitution granted a
particular civil liberty to the individual, he was far more willing
than Goldberg to expand the application of that liberty. The most
powerful example of this tendency was his advocacy of the "incorporation" df all of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment. This notion was specifically rejected by Goldberg in Griswold.
There is a strain in Black's thinking which places an almost naive
trust in the Founding Fathers; a belief that they set up a code
of political values for the individual which, if protected through a
literal interpretation of the Constitution, will provide the individual with all of the liberties he will ever need. Goldberg's view
of the judicial power was more elastic, for it was based upon the
premise that concepts like due process are not static and that dangers
emanating from arbitrary state power can be so subtle and so ingenious as to be unforeseeable by the most forward looking of men.
VI.

CONCLUSION

-

This article has attempted to capture one aspect of a Supreme
Court Justice's total value system. To make this possible it has been
necessary to stress both the man's individual notions of judicial
policy-making and his ideological ties with the eight other men
who together had to decide the pressing legal controversies presented during his stay on the Court. Surely this bifaceted approach
is mandatory; all of us are members of groups and responsive to
their norms _and the beliefs of their leaders, while, at the same time,
each must live with the standards of conduct he has established for
himself.
Each of these tasks has required a somewhat different tool of
analysis. Goldberg's adherence to a so-called "libertarian bloc"
has been brought out through the use of as much quantitative data
as could be extracted from Supreme Court decisions. On the
other hand, the subtleties of his value orientation can be explained
only by qualitatively assessing the major strands of his commitment
in relation to the beliefs of his colleagues. The choice of techniques
has been entirely pragmatic. Quantitative methods provide a certain
rigor and clarity which qualitative approaches cannot match; but
they are useless if they do not measure reliably the choices with
which decision-makers are faced. Furthermore, it is obvious that
computers cannot tell us very much about the real differences of
opinion between people. It is true they are able to determine that
Goldberg agreed more often with Brennan than with Black. They
can also identify the classes of cases where disputes were most prev-
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alent. But they cannot provide edification as to whether one disagreement is more important than eight agreements, nor can they
tell us whether a category of disagreements has any greater implications in describing and characterizing the attitudes of Justices than
are plainly evident from the cases themselves.
"
Keeping in mind, then, the respective roles of qualitative and
quantitative analysis in interpreting our data, an examination of all
that has gone before yields the conclusion that Goldberg, while a
"libertarian," was closer in his commitment to the credo to Brennan
and Warren than he was to Douglas and Black. To be sure, his disagreements with Brennan and Warren are significant to the student
of constitutional law, but, generally speaking, they are confined to
discrete classes of litigation. On the other hand, his antagonism
toward the civil liberties postures of Douglas and Black is often
so basic as to cut across several categories and, thus, to reach the
level of philosophical disharmony.
In a sense, the differences between Goldberg and Douglas constitute a small, but meaningful, illustration of the divergent outlooks
one might often expect to find among Justices even if the libertyauthority continuum under investigation is one-dimensional. In
other words, we may assume that all Supreme Court members would
have somewhat varying conceptions of how best to balance a citizen's
community obligations with his individual rights even if there were
general agreement as to what correlative obligations and rights were
most appropriate for our society at a given time. These differences
in view would range from the trivial to the widespread, from the
random to the consistent. That the liberty-authority continuum for
the Court tended toward unidimensionality is evidenced by the fact
that there is a near congruence between Goldberg's ideological
adherents and the "libertarians" with whom he typically joined in
decision-making. In the case of Goldberg and Douglas, the best
evidence that there is only one level of tension at work is the fact
that Douglas, with the exception of Griswold v. Connecticut, always
weighted the scales of policy-making in favor of personal rights as
heavily as did Goldberg; indeed, in a wide variety of significant
cases, he managed to go even further.
When we examine the Goldberg-Black relationship, however, the
utility of the liberty-authority continuum decreases considerably.
Obviously, this concept is no more accurate a description of the
relationship benveen Goldberg and Black than would be a description of American politics in terms of a struggle between activists and
restrainers, liberals and conservatives, or relativists and absolutists.
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Rather, Black and Goldberg are individuals who accept the primacy of "libertarian" values, but who in large measure cannot
concur on the nature of the component parts of the "libertarian"
system or on the interrelationship of those parts.
Finally, there is one other thing that numbers cannot do, and
that is to assess normatively the values of the Justices. No one
would argue this point. This article offers no judgment, considered
or otherwise, as to whether Mr. Justice Goldberg's jurisprudence
was better than that of any or all of his brethren. Such an evaluation
must wait for another day. It is to be hoped, however, that in terms
of the "liberty-society" alternative presented here, all of the data
one will need in order to make this assessment have been gathered
and presented.
APPENDIX A
NOTES ON METHODOLOGY

There has been some disagreement among scholars as to the most
feasible means by which one can make use of Supreme Court decisions to demonstrate empirically voting patterns among Justices.
The basic controversy appears to center around the question whether
one is trying, or should be trying, to measure issues or votes. C. Herman Pritchett, who initially demonstrated the fruitfulness of empirical analysis of Supreme Court decision-making, seemed to advocate the former approach. 1 He coded the policy preferences of J ustices only in non-unanimous, formal opinions appearing in the
first section of the United States Reports, including "per curiams
reported in the same manner as full opinions." 2 Furthermore, he
counted opinions, not cases,3 so that several cases decided by one
opinion were counted together as one. 4 It follows that one dissent
applicable to more than one formal opinion was probably treated
as a single dissent rather than as two (or more) negative votes. 5
Finally, Pritchett evaluated certain concurrences as dissents depending upon whether the cleavage represented "a fundamental diver1. His landmark studies are PRITCHEIT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT (1954)
[hereinafter cited as CIVIL LIBERTIES]; and PRITCHEIT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY
IN JUDICIAL PoLmcs AND VALUES, 1937-1947 (1948) [hereinafter cited as THE ROOSEVELT
COURT].
2. CIVIL LIBERTIES at 257 n.39.
3. THE ROOSEVELT COURT at 289 n.2.
4. However, companion cases requiring opinions of their own, no matter how
brief, were individually included in his sample.
5. This is Schubert's conclusion. See SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 164 (1959). My understanding (though not my evaluation) of Pritchett's
quantitative methodology is predicated in some measure on Schubert's earlier research. See id. at 78-80, 164-66.
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gence in judicial attitude from that of the majority [opinion]," 6
and, evidently, coded tw-o Justices as agreeing in dissent only when
they signed the same opinion. 7 The Pritchett approach in quantitatively examining the civil libertarian attitudes of Justices appears to
be essentially this: Inspect the facts of each opinion to see if a due
process, free speech, or similar claim is involved, read the case, and
then code each participant depending upon his approval or disapproval of the claim. Any voting bloc which emerges will be the
function of the Justice's "libertarian" sentiments and their perceptions of the Court's role as a decision-maker in our society. 8
Glendon Schubert's use of bloc analysis differs radically from
Pritchett's.9 Pritchett's technique, Schubert believes, is feasible only
for determining the power structure and strength of conflicting
factions on the Court. The investigation of judicial attitudes toward issues can better be conducted through scalogram and factor
analysis. The result is that Schubert counts votes, not opinions. All
cases stand on their own because "the underlying assumption is that
each justice makes a separate decision in each case...." 10 Obviously
all concurrences must be coded as agreements with the majority,
while all dissenters are considered allies.
To the extent that the present investigation relies on content
analysis, it is surely closer to Pritchett's orientation than to the
Schubert approach. Still, some of Pritchett's methodological notions
were deemed inappropriate to this study. No decision was included
unless it presented some unique constitutional issue. The purpose for
so limiting the sample was to prevent the data from becoming stilted
through the inclusion of duplicate items. Pritchett recognized this
problem as crucial when he stated: "[counting such decisions] does
result in giving multiple weight to alignments on a single issue
arising out of almost identical factual situations."11 Nevertheless,
Pritchett counted all cases of a particular genre whether or not they
were unique. Another difference between Pritchett's methods and
those used in this study is that, in this investigation, Justices are
sometimes coded as "libertarian" or "non-libertarian" allies irrespective of whether they overtly concurred in one another's opinions.
A special attempt has been made here to isolate the several conflicting strains of "libertarian" ideology contained within a single
6. THE ROOSEVELT COURT at 289 n.2.
7. "In such cases [where colleagues join in opposition for different reasons] the

dissenting justices may need to be sbown as disagreeing with the majority but also
as disagreeing with the other dissenters." CIVIL LIBERTIES at 275 n.l (ch. IX); see
SCHUBERT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 165.
8. CIVIL LIBERTIES at 186-92.
9. See SCHUBERT, op. cit. supra note 5, ch. III.
IO. Id. at 79.
11. CIVIL LIBERTIES at 274-75 n.I.
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decision. Under the techniques developed by Pritchett for measuring adherence to an ideology, a case such as Quantity of Books would
be treated merely as a free speech controversy, with seven Justices
coded as having supported plaintiff's allegations while the minority
of two would be classified as being opposed to the claim.12 With
due deference, this system of scoring tells us almost nothing about
the marrow of constitutional doctrine at stake in this controversy.
The approach utilized here also avoids the use of Guttman scaling
analysis, which Schubert believes to be adequate £or the testing of
the civil libertarian notions of the Justices. Yet, in explaining his
theory, Schubert states: "The justices respond, not by the words
they use in their Opinions, but by the ways in which they vote." 13
Thus, Schubert would deal with Quantity of Books just as Pritchett
would, throwing it into the "free speech hopper" and coding it as
a seven to two "libertarian" judgment. To the author's knowledge,
all previously published studies involving cumulative scaling of
Supreme Court decisions in civil liberties cases suffer from this drawback.14
There are tw'O criticisms of the scaling approach to quantifying
judicial decision-making that some might find applicable to the
methods adopted in this study. Becker, in a recent publication, has
disputed the argument lodged by Schubert and Harold Spaeth that
scaling can account £or the "attitudes" of Justices. 15 After all, he
claims, votes are only votes and what they mean in terms of causal
relations cannot be verified empirically merely by arranging the
votes in some order. While Becker's point is well taken, it cannot
be said to be relevant to a quantitative approach that gauges overtly
stated attitudes themselves. A closely related, but somewhat different,
criticism comes from Joel Grossman. He questions Ulmer's (and,
necessarily, Schubert's) scalograms because they order a hierarchy of
cases predicated on one variable, such as civil liberties, free speech,
or economic liberalism.16 The £act is that different Justices, he
claims, perceive a controversy in different ways. For example, how
could one consider Frankfurter as casting a vote against a due
process claim when he thinks of the case as "primarily a question
of achieving a federal balance in criminal proceedings. . . .''17 It
12. Id. at 190.
13. SCHUBERT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 273.
14. See, e.g., Schubert, The 1960 Term of the Supreme Court: A Psychological
Analysis, 56 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 90, 97-99 (1962); Ulmer, The Analysis of Behavior
Patterns on tlze United States Supreme Court, 22 J. PoL. 629-53 (1960). It would be
interesting to see if Guttman's methods could be fruitfully utilized to scale "issues"
rather than "decisions."
15. BECKER, POUTICAL BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE 12 (1964).
16. Grossman, Role-Playing and the Analysis of Judicial Behavior: The Case of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 11 J. PUB. L. 285 (1962).
17. Id. at 293.
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cannot be denied that Justices view cases, from a normative standpoint, in terms of their particular scales of values. But whether a
Justice's "societal" view is colored by so-called institutional factors
(for instance, he may not believe that the judiciary is responsible
for redressing this class of grievances), or is a product of his "authoritarian personality," his stand on the issue still represents an
interpretation of constitutional law and, in the Frankfurter opinion
just mentioned, a vote against a due process claim.
APPENDIX B1
CASES TAKEN FROM THE

1962

TERM

Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
*Arlan's Dep't Store v. Kentucky, 371 U.S. 218 (1962).
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). 2
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963).
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
*Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).3
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
*Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 4
*Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963). 15
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
1. A case that has been "starred" is one which the "libertarians" were in disagree•
ment over the application of a constitutional right. Decisions containing two or
more issues :requiring "libertarian" or "societal" responses have been indicated
through app:ropriate footnoting with the issues described in brief below.
2. This holding presents differences of opinion as to the meaning of both equal
protection and due process.
3. The two issues contained in this decision are: (1) To what extent are the states
limited by the Mapp :rule; (2) How should that :rule be construed in the instant case?
4. In this controversy, the meaning of both portions of the first amendment's
guarantee of :religious freedom are in dispute.
5. :Slack, Warren, and Douglas filed a dissent based on "serious errors den}ing
the defendants the protection of two constitutional guarantees for a fair trial." These
were (1) legality of defendant's confession, and (2) falsity of material witness' testimony.
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APPENDIX C
CASES TAKEN FROM THE 1963 TERM
*Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
*Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964).1
A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).2
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
*Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
*Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
*Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
*Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).3
*Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).4
Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. l (1964). 5
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
*New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 6
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
*Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575 (1964).
*United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964).7
*United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. l (1964).8
«'Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).

I. The question whether the law at issue is unconstitutional was decided by a
vote of six to two. On the other hand, Black and Douglas vehemently disagreed on
the meaning of the constitutional right to travel abroad.
2. There are two levels of division here. The first involves the constitutionality
of procedures; the second, whether the books themselves may be proscribed.
3. This case contains four issues of significance. They are: (1) Can the state decide for itself whether a judge or jury shall determine the voluntariness of confes•
sions? The vote here was six to three; (2) Is a jury required? Black and Clark answered this in the affirmative; (3) Is petitioner entitled to a new trial? Again, Black
and Clark dissented; and (4) Was the confession coerced? Black stood alone on this
question.
4. The four issues here are: (1) Can movies believed to be obscene be suppressed;
(2) What is the nature of "contemporary community standards"; (3) Should the
Supreme Court make a de novo review of all films found obscene; and (4) Can "The
Lovers" be proscribed on this ground?
5. The two questions presented in this decision are whether the self-incrimination
part of the fifth amendment is "incorporated" into the fourteenth amendment, and
whether plaintiff has been denied a right under this provision. A third issue, dealing
with whether the theory of "incorporation" applies to all of the Bill of Rights, is
coded in Griswold v. Connecticut.
6. The two levels of disagreement here involve whether equal protection was
violated and whether the court should establish the "one man-one vote" principle.
7. There are two issues here: (1) Was Ross Barnett entitled to a trial by jury;
and (2) Can a judge exact even trivial penalties in criminal contempt cases of the
type at issue?
8. The constitutional questions here involve the application of Article I, Section 2
and the equal protection clause.
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1964

TERM

*Angelet v. Fay, 381 U.S. 654 (1965).
*Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
*Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 (1964).
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).1
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 2
*Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
*El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
*Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).3
*Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
*Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
*Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
*Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).4
Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965).
Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965).
*Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
*McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
*One Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
*Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).11
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
*United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965).6
*United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
*Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I (1965).
I. Harlan disagreed with seven of his colleagues regarding two aspects of equal
protection.
2. This case clearly deals with two distinct matters. The first of these is a breach
, of the peace question; the second concerns blocking public passages. However, the
latter has two discernible aspects, one involving the Justices' reactions to free speech,
the other relating to their views of equal protection.
3. In this decision, there are disputes as to whether petitioner was denied due
process and whether television should be barred from all criminal court proceedings.
4. Griswold contains issues relating to the sweep of due process and free speech.
There is also the matter of "incorporating" the :Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment. Those Justices who expressed their opinions in the Malloy holding are
also coded here.
5. The three dissenters disagree with the reasoning set out in White's opinion.
Secondly, there is a difference of opinion between the dissenters and Black, at least to
the extent that Black's vote serves to deny a "libertarian" claim put forth by the
appellant.
6. There are three questions: self-incrimination; the right to jury trial; and due
process.

